Delay in filing an appeal caused by official procedures of a government agency may be condoned upon consideration of sufficient cause: High Court
 |
| Regarding Condonation of Delay under Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1908 |
Justice Md. Riaz Uddin Khan of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh delivered the judgment on September 8, 2026, in Civil Revision No. 4686 of 2004, Bangladesh Railway v. Shafiqul Islam. The Court set aside the order of the District Judge of Lalmonirhat rejecting the application for condonation of delay and condoned the 168-day delay in filing the appeal by Bangladesh Railway.
Background of the Case
According to the case record, Shafiqul Islam filed Other Suit No. 68 of 2002 in the Court of the Assistant Judge of Lalmonirhat against Bangladesh Railway and other defendants. His principal contention was that the judgment and decree passed on September 28, 1997, in Other Suit No. 117 of 1994—the decree having been signed on October 5, 1997—were collusive, made against him, and not binding upon him.
After trial, the concerned court delivered judgment and decree in favour of Shafiqul Islam on November 24, 2003. Bangladesh Railway challenged the decision by filing Appeal No. 28 of 2004 before the District Judge of Lalmonirhat. As the appeal was filed 168 days late, an application for condonation of delay was submitted under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908.
The District Judge rejected the application on August 1, 2004. Bangladesh Railway then filed a civil revision before the High Court under Section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging that order.
Observations of the High Court
Upon examining the application, the records of the lower court, and the application for condonation of delay, the High Court found that the District Judge had rejected the application without properly considering the reasons for the delay.
Bangladesh Railway informed the Court that, after obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree, time was required to obtain the opinion of the concerned legal adviser, complete the necessary budget allocation and approval procedures, and prepare the memorandum of appeal and the application for condonation of delay through its lawyer. The 168-day delay occurred because of these official procedures.
The Court observed that a government agency must follow various stages of administrative procedure when making decisions and conducting litigation. The explanation for the delay must therefore be assessed in light of that reality. The High Court found the explanation provided by Bangladesh Railway satisfactory and held that it constituted “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Decision in Light of Earlier Precedents
The Court referred to the observations of the Appellate Division in Bangladesh v. Jaheruddin, 1986 BLD (AD) 180. That decision held that the government does not enjoy any special privilege; however, the various stages involved in governmental decision-making may, in appropriate circumstances, justify consideration of a delay. The same standard of acceptability must apply to the government and ordinary litigants.
The Court also considered the principles laid down in Government v. Alauddin, 6 BLC (AD) 101. It further took into account the liberal approach adopted by the Supreme Court of India in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, as well as the principles approved by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in 59 DLR (AD) 1.
In light of these precedents, the Court held that a mechanical or excessively technical approach should not be adopted when considering an application for condonation of delay. Where sufficient cause exists and the interests of justice so require, the parties should be given an opportunity to have the case decided on its merits.
Final Decision of the Court
The High Court held that Bangladesh Railway had sufficiently explained the delay and that the District Judge had failed to properly assess the law and the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the High Court made the Rule absolute, set aside the District Judge’s order dated August 1, 2004, and condoned the 168-day delay in filing the appeal.
The concerned appellate court was also directed to proceed with the disposal of the appeal expeditiously in accordance with law after notifying all parties. The Court specifically noted that the appeal had been filed in 2004. No order was made as to costs, and the interim order previously granted was vacated.
Legal Takeaways
The judgment demonstrates that, while considering an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is essential to properly assess the reasons for the delay and the surrounding circumstances. The official procedures of a government agency may form part of the explanation for delay; however, merely being a government agency does not automatically create a right to condonation.
Where sufficient cause for the delay is established and the interests of justice require it, the court should provide an opportunity for the appeal to be considered on its merits. Nevertheless, the explanation for delay must be assessed in every case on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.
BD Law Post / Masum
